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Should the Government Invest,  
or Try to Spur Private Investment?
MICHAEL CRAGG AND JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ
T
hough the word ‘stimulus’ has fall-
en out of favor, all agree that the 
U.S. economy needs stimulation. 
We suffer a deficiency in aggregate 
demand. Today, the debate is about 
how best to strengthen demand—especially at 
a time when the country seems so focused on 
the size of its deficits and the national debt. 
We need to look for programs that deliver a 
big bang for the buck now, and promote growth 
in the future. Such programs might lower the 
national debt in the medium to long run, even 
if the deficit increases today. Not surprisingly, 
policies and programs that seek to stimulate in-
vestment, both in the public and private sector, 
top the list. 
President Obama has proposed a simple 
and, at first blush, intuitively appealing invest-
ment-stimulus policy of allowing businesses 
to accelerate depreciation tax deductions for 
investments made in 2011. While the support 
from business for this policy comes as no sur-
prise, in our opinion there are better options 
that would have both lower fiscal costs and 
larger investment stimulus. 
the administration’s plan and its problems
The Administration estimates that 1.5 mil-lion firms will accelerate deductions, 
thereby garnering $200 billion in tax reduc-
tions at a cost to the government of only $30 
billion over the next 10 years.1 Accelerations in 
depreciation deductions act as an interest-free 
loan from the government to the private sector, 
with the loan to each taxpayer paid back by the 
taxpayer over time through higher future taxes 
(with no change in their pre-tax profits). The 
low cost that the Administration has calculated 
that the program will incur is the direct result 
of current low interest rates, which allow the 
government to borrow cheaply in order to lend 
to the private sector. 
If investment is not stimulated, and gov-
ernment and firms each face the same inter-
est rate, then the benefit to the private sector 
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is equal to the cost to the government. It is 
simply a matter of redistribution. With zero 
interest rates all around, more depreciation de-
ductions would have no benefits—but neither 
would they have costs. Typically, though, firms 
pay higher interest rates than the government 
does. This means that the value to firms of an 
accelerated depreciation policy is greater than 
the (direct, first round) cost to the government. 
For large American corporations, however, the 
benefit is likely to be limited: Right now, the 
treasury yield curve is approximately 25 ba-
sis points (bp) for a year, 150bp for 5 years, 
and 400bp for 30 years. Meanwhile, corporate 
spreads are less than 100bp for credit rated 
higher than BBB. Furthermore, many of these 
firms are awash in cash. Therefore, for these 
highly-rated firms, the social value of an inter-
est-free loan is likely to be quite low, since they 
already enjoy very low interest rates. 
In the current context of high deficits and 
indebtedness, we should look askance at any 
redistribution of money from the public sector 
to the corporate sector. With tough budgetary 
constraints facing the government, providing 
government money to firms to invest displaces 
money available from the government’s own 
investment programs. Thus, we have to con-
sider the value we gain for each dollar spent 
in redistribution. Not only must there be in-
creased investment, but the increase must also 
be large enough to compensate for the tight-
ened budgetary position of the government. 
The economy benefits when—but only when—
the accelerated depreciation leads to more total 
investment. The critical question then is: How 
much investment will there be that otherwise 
would not have occurred? The answer is, prob-
ably not very much. If public investments in 
education or technology are cut back, then not 
only will output today be lower, but so too will 
growth in the future. As a result, future deficits 
and the size of the debt will be larger because 
of diminished tax collections. Thus, for accel-
erated depreciation to have a positive effect on 
the economy, it must induce private investment 
substantially—in amounts that exceed the ‘gift’ 
from the government. 
Assuming that the firms most likely to uti-
lize this deduction pay taxes at the top rate of 
35% and have access to capital, accelerated 
depreciation will allow corporations to save at 
least $100 billion in financing expenses with-
out any change in their investment behavior.2 
Thus, one can at once understand why corpo-
rations are excited by this gift from the taxpay-
ers for merely doing what they would have 
done anyway! 
why a targeted policy of investment 
deductions would be preferable to the 
administration’s approach
A targeted policy of investment deductions would be better. For instance, one could 
only allow firms to take the accelerated deduc-
tion for increased investment. Large capital 
projects already under way can easily be ex-
cluded from the program. More broadly, firms 
might receive the benefit only for expenditures 
in excess of, say, 80% of their investment levels 
in earlier years. 
Although better than the Administration’s 
plan, even a targeted approach is still likely to 
have a limited impact—for capital constraints 
are often to blame for the lack of investment 
among the firms that are not undertaking it. 
Some will have made profits in the past, so a 
loss carry-forward provision for firms invest-
ing incrementally, and only for such firms, 
will spur investment (though at some cost to 
the Treasury). However, many firms that are 
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at the investment margin, and for which in-
vestment subsidies provide the most bang for 
the buck, are also the riskier firms, and they 
currently face credit constraints in the form 
of tightened lending standards, higher inter-
est rates and very high equity costs. Further-
more, these firms may also be at a stage where 
they are not yet earning profits that would be 
taxed. For such firms, accelerated depreciation 
is irrelevant. 
Accelerated depreciation is, in some ways, 
an ‘old economy’ approach to stimulating in-
vestment. The biggest benefits go to those in 
heavy industry, with long-term investments, 
who have access to capital. The benefits to 
many small- to medium-sized enterprises—in, 
say, the service sector—with more short-lived 
investments and without access to credit, are 
nonexistent. In short, the proposed acceler-
ated depreciation targets its benefit exactly in 
the areas where that benefit is not needed. 
alternatives that are preferable to both 
the administration’s plan and targeted 
investment deductions
There are several better policy alternatives for periods of extreme economic malaise 
like today’s. First, we suggest resurrecting an 
old idea from the Kennedy era—an incremen-
tal investment tax credit (ITC). The advantage 
of an investment tax credit is that it immedi-
ately lowers the price of all capital goods to all 
firms, whether or not they earn profits (if the 
credit is refundable), and whether or not the 
assets are short- or long-lived. This measure 
thus overcomes accelerated depreciation’s in-
herent bias toward long-lived assets purchased 
by profitable firms. We emphasize, how-
ever, that the policy should be implemented 
as an incremental investment tax credit, un-
der which the government pays a fraction of 
the cost of any incremental investment. Not 
to do so provides a very expensive gift to all 
investment, including that which is already 
occurring.
However, an incremental ITC alone is un-
likely to have significant impacts because the 
firms at the investment margin that are likely 
to see the largest benefit—and that are most 
likely to respond by increasing investment—
are also those that have some, but limited, ac-
cess to capital. It is actually more important 
to direct attention to credit-constrained firms. 
This leads us to ask, are there additional 
policies that are likely to be of particular ben-
efit to this class of firms? 
There is an additional problem with both 
ITC and accelerated depreciation. Typically, in 
downturns, economists recommend temporary 
measures, like temporary investment tax cred-
its or accelerated depreciation. These attempt 
to smooth the economic downturn by encour-
aging future investment to happen sooner than 
it would have otherwise. The credits provide an 
incentive for investing today—when resources 
are underutilized—rather than next year. But 
we are in the midst of what many consider to 
be a long-term downturn, and such measures 
are unlikely to have a large impact: They simply 
move investment around within the downturn, 
promoting investment now at the expense of 
investment a little later in the downturn. Simi-
larly, the cash-for-clunkers program succeeded 
in stimulating more car purchases for a while, 
but when the program ended, car purchases 
fell. It has succeeded only in moving car pur-
chases forward by a few months. With large 
corporations flush with cash and interest rates 
at historic lows, there should be great con-
cern regarding the costs to the government of 
simply moving corporate investment around 
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within the downturn. Small- to medium-sized 
enterprises, which can’t access capital, face the 
most important constraints. It is this kind of 
constraint that policymakers need to address.
A targeted credit-enhancement facility, 
together with a targeted ITC, holds out the 
promise of actually raising investment by also 
enhancing access to credit among small- to 
medium-sized enterprises. The Administra-
tion has developed experience with this type of 
policy. For instance, according to the Govern-
ment Accountability Office, in 2009, the recent 
Department of Energy loan-guarantee program 
for green energy projects received $190 billion 
in applications for loan guarantees. Over the 
course of two years, the DOE built a project-
financing capability with more than 100 em-
ployees and contractors, which it deployed to 
help credit-constrained firms make early-stage 
investments. At the same time, the banking 
community became familiar with how such a 
program works. In short, this shows that the 
government has already created the necessary 
infrastructure for fostering quick, incremen-
tal investment in at least one area. Well-de-
signed credit-enhancement programs involve 
some risk absorption by the government and, 
importantly, private lenders must still bear 
some risk to obviate the problems of moral 
hazard. (The mortgage crisis forcefully demon-
strated this moral-hazard problem. But there, 
originators bore none of the risk—and even 
today, they are objecting to bearing as little as 
5 percent. Comparable problems have been 
addressed in other loan guarantee programs 
where there was sensitivity to these problems, 
such as the U.S. SBA, the Canadian CSBF, and 
similar programs in many other countries.)3
An additional approach recognizes that ac-
celerated depreciation is a direct benefit to the 
leasing industry, which, like banks, may not 
be extending leases because they are worried 
that small- to medium-sized enterprises may 
be unable to reliably service them. The solu-
tion to this investment impediment is for the 
government to partially underwrite lease guar-
antees. A policy of accelerated depreciation 
for bank investments on leases for assets they 
purchase on behalf of small- to medium-sized 
firms, together with lease guarantees, would 
open another channel for investment that is 
otherwise blocked.
The supply of credit from our banking sys-
tem to businesses is lower today than it was 
three years ago and continues to remain weak. 
In spite of all the fanfare about saving the banks 
to ensure the flow of credit, that stream is still 
dry. The banks say this is partly because lend-
ing is just too risky—and that there are more 
profitable ways of making money, by trad-
ing rather than lending. Credit enhancement 
would at least weaken this excuse for not lend-
ing—and might actually lead to more lending 
and investment.
As we stated at the outset, the root of the 
current economic malaise is a deficiency in ag-
gregate demand. The challenge is to find pro-
grams that maximize positive impact for any 
given adverse effect on the deficit and debt. 
We have explained why there are several al-
ternatives that are superior to the Administra-
tion’s proposal for accelerated depreciation. 
We conclude with still one more proposal—
one that would have no short-run budgetary 
impact, and that would likely have a positive 
long-run effect. 
Currently, U.S. corporations have much 
more than $1 trillion in unrepatriated dividends 
in foreign subsidiaries. The unrepatriated divi-
dends are the result of the U.S. policy of taxing 
global earnings at a rate substantially higher 
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than most of the rest of the world.4 Consider 
a policy that allows a tax-free repatriation of 
offshore earnings, if the corporation puts the 
tax that it would have otherwise paid for the 
repatriation into an investment pool. The in-
vestment pool must be used within a two-year 
period, for making investment in firms at the 
investment margin (e.g. small- to medium-
sized firms that are credit-constrained). This 
would provide an incentive for broad invest-
ment coordination across small, medium 
and large firms that could remove the logjam 
caused by pessimistic expectations. For finan-
cial firms, the requirement would be to place 
the investment pools in the hands of the Small 
Business Administration, for use in lending to 
small businesses. The attractiveness of such 
policies is that they entail no immediate bud-
get impact—and even possibly none in the 
future—while at the same time providing re-
wards that affect healthy firms in a way that 
will simultaneously change their behavior.
The federal budget situation places a pre-
mium on moving beyond ‘old economy’ ideas 
and taking advantage of some of the true in-
novations in finance. If we are to get a bang for 
the buck, we must make sure that there are no 
mindless giveaways. And accelerated deprecia-
tion or an investment tax credit comes close to 
being a mindless giveaway, unless it is targeted 
to projects and firms at the investment margin. 
But even targeted investment policies are cur-
rently inadequate, due to the hangover from 
the financial crisis—small- and medium-sized 
firms do not have access to the credit they 
need for investing. To get the economy going 
will require more than just speeches express-
ing optimism for the future, or cajoling firms 
or households to spend more money: We need 
carefully designed carrots and sticks. Poorly-
designed programs can be counterproductive: 
With government budgetary constraints ap-
pearing to be binding, cutbacks in government 
spending could more than offset any increases 
in private spending, and reduced public in-
vestment could more than offset increased 
private investment, weakening future growth. 
We have proposed several modest, low-cost 
measures, the benefits of which would almost 




2. The Administration calculates that the $200 billion 
in tax deductions will be taken at a cost of $30 bil-
lion over ten years. Assuming that the firms most 
likely to utilize this deduction are in the top mar-
ginal bracket of 35%, this represents approximately 
$575 billion in investment that will likely occur 
anyway. The capital structure for this $575 billion 
in investment would be $200 billion in foregone tax 
payments—which is effectively a loan at 0%—and 
$375 billion in debt and equity financing. Thus, the 
aggregate borrowing costs for such projects would 
be reduced by approximately one-third. Assuming 
conservatively that the cost of capital is 5%, and that 
this investment was already going to happen, this 
policy represents $100 billion in interest-rate sav-
ings (annual savings of 5% on $200 billion over 10 
years) to corporations, for not changing their behav-
ior—at a cost of $30 billion to U.S. taxpayers. 
3. See for instance World Bank Policy Research Paper 
4771 “The Typology of Partial Credit Guarantee 
Funds around the World,” Thorsten Beck, Leora F. 
Klapper, Juan Carlos Mendoza, published in 2008, 
and also “Facilitating Access to Credit,” OECD Dis-
cussion Paper presented March 13-14, 2008 at the 
World Bank Workshop on Partial Credit Guarantees, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/5/45324327.pdf.
4. Most countries tax corporate earnings on a terri-
torial basis, whereas the U.S. does so on a global 
basis, providing a foreign tax credit for taxes paid 
in countries taxing territorial income. Since U.S. 
corporate tax rates are some of the highest in the 
world, it provides U.S. corporations an incentive 
to invest and accumulate earnings abroad. When 
foreign investment opportunities are exhausted, as 
Letters commenting on this piece or others may 
be submitted at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/
submit.cgi?context=ev.
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they appear to be today, these accumulated earnings 
are invested in the equivalent foreign money market 
mutual funds. On net, this is a fairly unproductive 
use of capital.
